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OUR DUTY TO SPAIN.
The complaints which the Spanish Ministry is said to have
made to our government, of its laxness in preventing filibuster-
ing expeditions, have called out from the Secretary of the Navy
an interesting rejoinder. The statement of Mr. Long attempts
to show on the part of the United States a diligence in preserv-
ing its neutrality, that is not only "due" but even unusual under
the circumstances. Thii correspondence is not yet published.
The mere fact of its existence and probable tenor, is known.
We cannot scrutinize the assertions of fact and law and pre-
cedent therein contained. Nevertheless, perhaps we may use
the incident to advantage as a peg upon which to hang two
inquiries, the one relating to fact, the other to law; the one
recalling a bitter national controversy, long since settled; the
other concerning the duties of a State in view of an insurrection
against a friendly power, an insurrection which cannot well be
recognized as belligerent.
What a faint and far-away memory that phrase "due dili-
gence" suggests! And yet in the Alabama Claims Arbitration,
a quarter century ago, national responsibility and millions of
dollars in damages, rested upon its interpretation.
The military engines which the Southern Confederacy bought
in neutral England prolonged the war, destroyed or drove to
other flags the commerce of the North, and gave rise to the
most serious complaints. Just so to-day, those military supplies
which Cuba buys from the manufacturers of the United States,
are prolonging the insurrection, may make independence possi-
ble, and do much to disturb our friendly relations with Spain.
They likewise may serve as a basis for claims for damages, in
no very distant future. There is an apparent parallelism be-
tween the two cases. Is it a real one?
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The salient features of our relations with neutral powers dur-
ing the Civil War, were these: the recognition of Southern
belligerency by the States whose interests were affected, which
thereby declared their neutrality; the application of the rules of
maritime capture to them, by both sides in the war thus recog-
nized; the sale of military supplies to the Confederates by neu-
tral merchants, the onus of preventing their delivery resting
upon the shoulders of the Northern government; finally, the
despatch of armed expeditions from British soil, coupled with
their illegal armament and enlistment of men, in British colonial
ports, with great damage to American commerce resulting.
There was an European sympathy for the Southern cause also,
which was galling to the North, but it is the unneutral act, not
the unneighborly sentiment, that international law takes
cognizance of.
Turn now to our relations with Cuba.
As the Cuban ports of importance are all in Spanish hands,
our shipping interests have not been so affected as to make the
recognition of Cuban belligerency necessary. Therefore, there
has been no blockade, no right to capture contraband on the
high seas, no right of search of American ships except within
Spanish jurisdiction. As in Great Britain in our Civil War,
there has been free sale of military supplies in our markets to
the Cubans, but with the assumption that the burden of pre-
venting them from reaching their destination rested upon Spain;
and lastly, armed expeditions, that is, the combination of muni-
tions of war with men enlisted to use them, have been checked
and in large measure prevented by our Government, at great
cost and with much trouble, by many arrests, several trials and
a few convictions, so that it can honestly say, as Secretary Long
does say, that it has exercised diligence in this regard.
American sympathy for the Cuban cause exists. It is natu-
ral, even inevitable. It is galling to Spain. But we say again
that expressions of sympathy are not within the cognizance of
the law.
Reviewing the two cases, we see that they are not parallel,
but in strong contrast.
The one was war, with neutral duties and belligerent rights.
The other is an insurrection, involving no neutral obligations,
strictly speaking, and no belligerent rights. The one put the
duty of preventing contraband articles from reaching their des-
tination where it belonged. In the other Spain appears to shirk
this duty; to try and place it upon the wrong shoulders. Negli-
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gence in the Alabama, Floridg and Shenandoah cases, made
Great Britain liable for the damage they caused, while no such
scandal in connection with Cuba can be brought home to the
United States. Its seaboard is long and intricate, the Cuban
coast near, absolute prevention of hostile expeditions well-
nigh impossible. But by the use of both navy and revenue
service the coast has been so efficiently policed as to make the
despatching of such expeditions very hazardous and very uncer-
tain. Due diligence has been observed. Can more be de-
manded?
And now for the second inquiry.
What is the law to govern a State in its relations to a mere
insurrection in a friendly country?
Is a State's own statutory law the sum and measure of its
duty in the case?
How far does the character of lawful commerce attach to
trade with the insurgents in military supplies?
Such questions as these have forced themselves upon both
executive and judicial departments in the United States within
the past three years. But there must naturally be a difference in
their point of view. The executive is guided by the general
principles of international law, and by its conviction of national
policy; while the courts, though also applying international
law, must be specifically bound to employ and interpret the
statutes enacted for the enforcement of that law. Violation of
the rights of another power by the executive calls for redress.
So, too, insufficiency of the statute, as interpreted, founds a
valid claim for damages. But an unpalatable interpretation of
a statute is not a ground for complaint, unless bad faith can be
proven. Where an insurrection breaks out in another state it is
to be remarked that one's own political relations with that state
are necessarily affected, for it involves the commerce and the
property rights of our citizens. If of a character to warrant it,
the insurrection will be recognized as belligerent. We are pre-
supposing, however, that for one reason or another this course is
inadmissible. There results no recognized war. There can,
therefore, be no neutrality (since neutrality implies war), nor
any neutral duties. We have so-called neutrality acts, which
operate without war, it is true, but the "neutrality" is here
merely a convenient name, and not a proof of status. The same
thing in England is called a Foreign Enlistment Act.
But though there may be no neutral duties and rights, tech.
nically speaking, there are nevertheless the duties which every
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state owes to every other; there are the rights of commercial
freedom which every state enjoys, and there is the right of self-
defense, the duty of maintaining its own integrity, which the
insurgents sovereign possesses.
These fundamental rights do not depend for their operation
upon any formal recognition of belligerency. Nor can I see
that they are called into being or changed in any way, by the
new-fangled recognition of insurgency-a phrase ascribed to the
late Dr. Wharton. When an internal disturbance in a friendly
state is. serious enough to affect another state's interests, the
executive consciousness of that fact finds expression. In our own
case, the form of expression will usually be a reference in some
message of the President to give notice of the facts and warn us
to obey our own statutes. This is what is meant by the term,
recognition of insurgency.
Now as to the private trade in war material. It is certain
that such trade with an insurgent body is at least as lawful and
unrestricted as with a recognized belligerent. The usage in
the latter case is unqestioned. Private trade in contraband is
permitted. Even where carrying contraband is forbidden by
executive order, as is sometimes done,' this simply means, in
actual practice, that the trade is liable to the penalty of confisca-
tion, if the offender is caught by the injured belligerent. The
neutral is never held responsible for the traffic in contraband so
long as it is purely a commercial transaction. Accordingly, a
body of law has grown up to govern such cases. States define
contraband by treaty. Such goods may be seized unless the
treaty substitutes preemption for confiscation. They may be
seized on the high sea even, if their hostile destination is clear.
In certain cases the ship is liable also. But the burden of pre-
vention is not saddled upon the neutral. The law and usage are
the resultant of two principles, the freedom of neutral trade,
and the belligerents' right of self-defense.
In the case of insurgency rather than belligerency, the only
question is whether the freedom of trade in war material is not
enlarged, whether the right of seizure is not restricted to the
coast sea of the insurgents sovereign. In the case of an armed
expedition like the Virginius there is authority and reason for
believing that search and seizure on the high seas are war-
ranted on the ground of self-defense. A similar claim to pre-
vent the trade in war material would probably not be submitted
1 E. g., by both British and Spanish proclamations of neutrality at the
-outset of our Civil War.
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to. However, for our present purposes, it is not necessary to
discuss this point. It is enough to emphasize the general law,
that no government can be held accountable for its citizens'
traffic in military supplies, not furnished to a visiting man-of-
war, nor in the hands of an expeditionary force. Its duty is
fulfilled when its subjects are warned of the risk of loss which
they incur by engaging in it.
The distinction already referred to, between contraband
goods which are mere commodities, and the same goods it may
be, with an organized body of men to use them, is a perfectly
reasonable one. It is the distinction between trade and an
armed expedition-between peace and war.
An insurrection breaks out in one of two states which are at
peace. The other is bound to prevent all persons within its
jurisdiction from assisting to wage war against its friend.
Where a ship is armed or men enlisted and an expedition set on
foot, with intent to assist the insurgent cause, that is waging
war. If such acts are made possible through the negligence of
the authorities, through lack of appropriate legislation, or
through a judicial breakdown involving more than an unpalatable
interpretation of the law, they are unfriendly and a ground
for damages.
This, then, in its simplest terms, is the sum of the rights and
duties which obtain between the United States and Spain at the
present time; to carry on trade with the Cubans even in war
material, subject to the Spanish right of seizure within their
own coast sea; to prevent our soil from being made a base from
which Cuban sympathizers wage war against Spain. These two
are the cardinal points, under the general principles of 'the law
of nations.2 Such general principles in a vital matter like this
should and do find expression and sanction in local legislation,
and such statutes are interpreted and enforced by the courts.
Neither insufficiency of the law, nor difficulty in enforcing it,
will excuse a government. As our diplomatists kept urging
upon England in the Alabama discussion, "If the law is insuffi-
cient, amend it; if sufficient, enforce it."
2The simplicity of the rule may be complicated by actions which involve
a violation or evasion of our revenue laws. Thus a ship with contraband and
a commercial crew. may clear for Havana, whereas, her real destination is
inferred to be some landing place, not a port of entry, on the Cuban coast. In
this connection the Itata case at San Diego may be recalled, which ship took
French leave of the authorities, and failed to comply with the port regulations,
yet the court acquitted her of the charge of violating the neutrality statute.
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Our next inquiry thus relates to the adequacy of our own
statutes, and to the good faith and effectiveness of their inter-
pretation and enforcement.
The statutes applicable to such aid as Cuba has sought, are
two, Sections 5283 and 5286 of the Revised Statutes of the United
States.
The first is aimed at "every person who, within the limits of
the United States, fits out and arms, or attempts to fit out and
arm, or procures * * * etc., or is concerned in * * * *
etc., with the intent that such vessel shall be employed in the
service of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district
or people, to cruise or commit hostilities against the subjects,
citizens or property of any foreign prince or state or of any
colony, district or people, with whom the United States are at
peace. * * * "
Here the offense is to be committed by means of a vessel and
that vessel must be armed. On this ground some prosecutions
have failed. Another point is, that the vessel is to be "employed
in the service of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony,
district orpjeople." Do the Cuban insurgents correspond to this
latter description?
Mr. Justice Brown, in the Carondelet (37 Fed. Rep. 799),
seems to hold to the contrary, and Judge Locke, in the Three
Friends,3 last year, took the same view. Justice Brown said:
"A vessel could hardly be said to enter the service 'of a foreign
prince or state or of a colony, district or people' unless our gov-
ernment had recognized Hippolyte's faction as at least consti-
tuting a belligerent," but the decision turned on another point.
The contrary view was taken by Mr. Wharton and Attorney-
General Hoar, who believed this statute applicable to, and in-
tended for just such an insurgent body as the Cubans form. In
contrast to this indefiniteness in the American- statute, compare
the wording of the British Foreign Enlistment Act. This for-
bids similar aid given to "any foreign prince, colony, province,
a part of any province or people, or any person or persons ex-
ercising or assuming to exercise the power of government in or
over any foreign country, colony, province, or part of any
province or people." In the English case, The Salvador, the
lower court held like Judge Locke, that the statute did not apply
to unrecognized insurgents in Cuba. But this decision was
overruled by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (The
3 See YALE LAw JOuRNAL, Vol. VI., No. 5, P. 283.
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Salvador, L. R., 3 P. C. 218). In view of the judicial interpre-
tation of our statute, it would seem that it is inferior in compre-
hensiveness to the English Act. But that it is so faulty as to
ground a claim for damages for unneutral conduct against the
United States, is very improbable. For it is sufficiently doubt-
ful, to warrant a trial if not a conviction, to detain the ship
although it may not forfeit it, and, besides this, Section 5286 is
comprehensive enough to forbid such an armed expedition as
would be obnoxious to the general principles of international
law already laid down. This reads as follows: "Every person
who, within the territory of the United States, begins or sets on
foot, or prepares the means for, any military expedition or enter-
prise, to be carried on from thence, against the territory or
dominions of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony dis-
trict or people, with whom the United States are at peace, shall
be deemed guilty," etc. Plainly, this statute is operative with-
out an:y recognition of belligerency and abundantly satisfies
the requirements of international law which forbid one state to
permit any hostile expedition to be preparedwithin its jurisdic-
tion against another state, its friend.
This, then, is the answer to the questions which we asked at
the outset: that trade in military material is lawful to the indi-
vidual; that the duty of a state is measured not by its statutes
but by the requirements of international law; that if those
statutes, as interpreted by its courts, are insufficient to lay down
its international duties and prevent their violation, that state is
liable; and that in the case of Spain and Cuba our statutes are
not strikingly faulty, although one could certainly be made
clearer and more comprehensive.
This Cuban insurrection, like the one in the seventies, has
put the United States into a difficult position. Its trade has
been cut off; its resources taxed to preserve its neutrality. But
as several., convictions show, and as the records of the navy and
revenue service testify, it has performed its international duties
with fidelity, with patience and with success.
Theodore S. Woolsey.
YALE UNIVERSITY, December i, 1897.
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